'Th e Father as Cause: Personhood Generating Otherness'. Without 'otherness' there can be no 'communion', and ' otherness' is ultimately originated -both within the Trinity and among the creatures and, of course, between God and the creation -by the 'person' of God the Father.
Th e polemical thrust of chapter 3 -and indeed of the whole book -is that ontological priority does not reside in an allegedly 'Augustinian' substratum of undiff erentiated essence of deity, the three being 'one because they are relations within the one divine substance' (p. 135) or, à la limite , the divine persons being 'accidents' of God (p. 202, n. 62), or even the perhaps kinder, gentler, more recent 'triunity' or 'co-emergence and co-inherence of the three persons' with their unity residing in their 'coinherence', which properly 'indicates how the three persons relate to each other, not how they came into being' (p. 136). Positively, it is the Father -as 'the giver' who freely originates the Son and Spirit -who is the ontological 'cause' of deity and the guarantor of the relations among the trinitarian persons, as well as, in and through the Son and the Spirit, the positer of the being of the creatures.
It is above all the great Cappadocians -Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen-who are given credit (see especially pp. 118-145, 155-177, and 180-195, but in fact passim ). As theologians, they reversed the philosophical Greek priority of substance ( ousia ) over person. 3 Th ey did this at the service of soteriology, clarifying what the council of Nicaea had affi rmed concerning the Son and applying it also to the Spirit (as the council of Constantinople, under their infl uence, would do). Only if the Son and the Holy Spirit had their origins on the uncreated side of the absolute dialectic with creation could created human beings be restored to the communion with God which God intended for themand with them could the world ( ktisis , not kosmos ; cf. p. 253) be restored to its purpose. Th at precisely is the Christian faith . Th e Cappadocians secured it intellectually by virtue of the exposition of personhood: 'the notion of person, if properly understood', says Zizioulas, is 'perhaps the only notion that can be applied to God without the danger of anthropomorphism' (p. 224). Technically put: personal being implies both 'reaching out' in freedom ( ekstasis ) and yet remaining 'integral and undivided' in its mode of existence ( hypostasis ), 'unique and unrepeatable', 'the bearer of its nature in its totality'. 'Without these two conditions, being falls into an a-personal reality, defi ned and described like a mere "substance", that is, it becomes an a-personal thing' (p. 212f.).
